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ARTICLE
THE CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE:

CAN GREENHOUSE GASES BE REDUCED ABSENT GOVERNMENT
MANDATES?
By Angie Farleigh *

The Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”) is a voluntary tradable
permit program for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
program includes voluntary emissions reductions and trading
for all six greenhouse gases. Trading in carbon dioxide is
expected to generate the most interest. Member companies
make a legally binding agreement to reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases by 4% below the average of their 1998-2001
emissions by 2006.1 This figure was reached during the design
phase, through consensus among the founding member
companies. It was a goal that all of the companies felt they
could reach, but CCX representatives note that it is possible
this number will change once the program is up and running.2
It is unclear whether this was a reduction that many of the
companies were going to achieve through other means,
regardless of their participation in the CCX.
CCX was initially funded by a $347,600 Joyce
foundation grant, administered by the Kellogg Graduate School
of Management at Northwestern University. Environmental
Financial Products, LLC performed the principle research for
the study. The exchange will be regulated by the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and N.M.
Rothschild & Son Ltd. will provide investment banking services.
Program Structure
The program is presumably modeled after the U.S.
acid rain (“SO2”) trading program which CCX Chairman and
CEO, Richard L. Sandor, helped design. Participants can receive
credits by reducing emissions, or generate “offset” credits by
engaging in offset projects.3 The market would consist of
tradable commodities, in the form of a ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent that could be bought and sold like shares of stock.4
The participants will use a web-based system regulated by the
NASD to buy and sell the credits.5 Each participating company
will have an account on the CCX registry containing tradable
emission allowances based on the 1% per year reduction goals.
Members will use the website to exchange bids and offers, but
will not know counterparties’ identities until trades clear.6 Any
member that achieves greater reductions than the stated goal
would be granted a credit slip, which could be traded to
companies that did not meet their goals. A participating
company must surrender one allowance or offset for every
ton of CO2 emitted over its limit.
The exchange will be available to greenhouse gas
emission sources, farm and forest carbon sinks, offset projects
and liquidity providers in the United States, as well as to offset
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providers in Brazil. Emission sources and offset projects in
Canada and Mexico will also be integrated into the program
after trading begins.7 The advisory board hopes to eventually
expand the program to include other international sources.
The program will be run principally by the CCX Board of
Directors, assisted by a small CCX staff. Richard Sandor will
serve as CCX’s CEO and Chairman.8 Maurice Strong, former
Chairman of the Earth Council, a Canadian NGO, will serve
as a Vice-Chairman of CCX.9 Mr. Strong is also the former
Under-Secretary General of the United Nations responsible
for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The other
Vice-Chairman of the exchange will be Les Rosenthal, a
principal of the Chicago-based commodities and futures
trading firm, Rosenthal Collins.10 Mr. Rosenthal is a former
Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade. Finally, former
Illinois Governor James R. Thompson, current Chairman of
Winston and Strawn, will serve as Director of CCX.11
CCX will also have a “high level” advisory board
consisting of a mixture of academics, scientists, policy experts,
and industry representatives.12 The role of the advisory board
is to provide “input as needed.”13 As the name suggests, their
function will be to give advice and not to participate in the
decision-making process.
Program Governance
In order to be a member of CCX, participants must
sign a contract promising to meet the stated emissions reductions
and to trade only on the CCX exchange for the four-year pilot
period.14 Like other commodity exchanges, the NASD will
look to verify reductions and has worked with the CCX to
devise compliance procedures for the program.15 The NASD
will be in charge of enforcing the caps and ensuring that the
credits traded in the exchange represent real, permanent
emissions reductions.16 To accomplish this goal, CCX and the
NASD have based much of the verification system on the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative (“GHG Protocol”), which
was developed by the World Resources Institute in 1998 in
order to standardize and legitimize GHG emissions from
companies around the world.17 The GHG Protocol helps
companies calculate and report their GHG emissions by
providing standards for accounting, setting reporting boundaries
for the company, setting baseline emissions levels and reporting
the emissions data.18 It also provides guidance to companies
on calculating GHG emissions, managing their inventory quality
23

and verifying their GHG emissions data.19 The GHG protocol
includes calculation tools that represent a “best practice” for
emissions calculation.20 In order to calculate its GHG emissions,
a company must input data on its activities into an Excel
spreadsheet and then select the appropriate emissions factors,
based on the Protocol’s step-by-step guidance. Emission factors
and calculation methods vary depending on the type of GHG,
the type of industry, and other site-specific activity data.21
The GHG Protocol, although helpful in designing a
verification system, was not a perfect fit for a trading program
like CCX.22 CCX is in the final stages of developing a new
protocol23 that will be approximately eighty percent based on
the GHG Protocol, and about twenty percent “custom fit” to
the needs of the program and its members.24 The result will
be a standardized emission submission protocol that all
members of the CCX must follow in order to participate in
the exchange. Standardizing the data that is submitted to the
CCX will ensure that all members are held to the same standard
and will make it easier for the NASD to audit the submissions.
Most of the initial member companies are large multinational
corporations that have already been tracking their GHG
emissions since 1990, either through the GHG Protocol or
some other comparable means. 25 All of the companies
participating in the CCX pilot program already have emissions
inventories built up and will be able to meet the new CCX
emission submission standards. Because CCX is still in the
pilot phase, officials have yet to develop procedures for smaller
companies that may want to join in the future, but do not have
the systems in place to meet the CCX rules.26
Once the protocol is in place, the NASD will verify
compliance with the rules by auditing each of the member
companies. 27 Auditors from the NASD will look at the
underlying data and documents that support the baseline and
emission numbers that the companies submit to the CCX.
These documents will include invoices, deliveries, receipts and
any other paperwork that the company used to establish its
baseline number and emissions.28
The NASD will also use its market surveillance
technologies to monitor trading activity for fraud and
manipulation.29 CCX is the final arbiter of the treatment of
the submitted data, not the NASD.30 The NASD scores the
submissions for accuracy and reports its findings to the CCX.
Any violations, whether through fraud or negligence, will be
policed by peer review under the same kind of enforcement
provisions for defaults on the stock exchanges.31 Companies
that fail to meet their commitments may face sanctions. Sandor
says he expects peer review to be effective and does not
anticipate the kind of market manipulation that has occurred
in the energy markets.32 Apparently, NASD officials share
Sandor’s faith in the honesty of the CCX members. One NASD
representative stated that, although there is always a risk of
falsifying documents, because most of the members of CCX
are huge corporations, they didn’t have to worry about fraud
as much as they would with smaller businesses.33
The Current Market for CCX Credits
Like other commodities, the buyers and sellers will
determine the price of the credits. Trading is expected to have
begun early in the summer of 2003. A few companies have
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already conducted a handful of bilateral trades for greenhouse
gas emissions. CCX says that carbon trades have already
surpassed $100 million, and, with the start of CCX, annual
trading could increase to the tens of billions.34
Most of the participants seem to be companies who
have experience with other pollution exchanges, either abroad35
or with the U.S. SO 2 trade allowances. Some of these
companies hope that participating in the CCX will allow them
to learn better ways to meet mandates abroad.36
One of the purposes of the exchange is to allow
companies that are subject to mandatory emissions reductions
in other jurisdictions, to take credit for the reductions made in
the United States. To this end, the designers of CCX will
create a registry of reductions claimed by each participant. They
hope to make the registry sufficiently accurate/adequate to gain
international credibility? a high enough quality that other programs
in other countries will accept it.37 However, acceptance will
still be on a case-by-case basis.
For the immediate future, the program’s pollution
credits will only be valid in parts of the U.S., Canada, Mexico38
and, to a limited extent, Brazil.39 None of these countries have
mandatory GHG programs.
Incentives to Participate
There are currently no mandatory Federal laws
requiring companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
This raises the question of why the CCX members are
participating in the program in the absence of a legal requirement
to do so. There are several possible reasons. Companies may
hope to develop a “green” reputation among stockholders
and the general public (i.e. potential stockholders). Additionally,
they may hope to reduce operating costs by reducing energy
costs and raising productivity.
The most likely reason is that companies may want to
get a head start in anticipation of any mandatory emissions
programs that the Bush Administration may implement.
Participation in the CCX, will not only reduce long-term costs
of controlling emissions, but it will also build the members’
GHG management and trading skills thus putting them in a
position to shape future policy debate.40 CCX companies will
also have strong grounds to ask U.S. lawmakers to recognize
emissions credits retroactively in the event that mandatory
reductions are ever implemented.41
Additionally, many multinational corporations might
want to get involved in this program because they may already
be feeling the effects of the Kyoto Protocol even though the
U.S. has not adopted it. In today’s global society, corporations
are increasingly interacting in foreign jurisdictions and are subject
to the laws of those jurisdictions, namely the provisions set
forth in the Kyoto Protocol.42 Therefore, many U.S.-based
companies that are forced to reduce GHGs in a foreign
jurisdiction could either buy additional credits in the foreign
jurisdiction, or decrease production in the foreign jurisdiction
or in the U.S.43
However, the much-touted perks of the program may
not be beneficial to all companies. For instance, TXU Corp.
was one of the companies that participated in the design of
the program, but has since decided not to participate in the
trading because it was not sure if it would be financially
24

beneficial.44
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the CCX Program
A.

The General Theory of Tradable Permit
Systems

There are two types of tradable permit systems. First,
there is the cap-and-trade program where a total resource access
limit is defined and then allocated among users. This is
commonly thought to be the most effective program because
the fixed upper limits guarantee that, even if there is an increase
in pollution sources, there will not be an increase in pollution.45
The second type of program is the tradable credit program,
which establishes an individual baseline for each user, usually
based on an existing technology-based standard.46 This type
of program is less effective because it only establishes a limit
for each source of pollution without setting an overall limit.47
Therefore, more sources can mean more pollution. CCX is
more similar to a tradable credit program because each
participating company has pledged to reduce their GHG
emissions 4% below their original baseline. This approach
makes the most sense given that CCX involves only a small
percentage of the total U.S. emission sources. A cap and trade
program would be more reasonable if the responsibility for
meeting an overall GHG limit were divided amongst all sources
in the U.S. Regardless of the type of system, because no emission
source in the U.S. is currently required to reduce GHG emissions,
any participation in voluntary programs such as CCX will result
in increased environmental protection.
In theory, a tradable permit system can be an effective
approach to dealing with many environmental problems.
Market driven policies are advantageous because they can
internalize the costs of compliance and lower the costs for
governments.48 In a perfectly competitive market, the permits
or credits will flow toward their highest value. 49 A system
such as CCX can optimize the value of the target resource—in
this case, the resource would be a GHG-free atmosphere. Such
permit systems will not achieve this goal if the market conditions
are not right.50 For instance, the system needs to be designed
to minimize the possibilities for market power and the presence
of high transaction costs or large uninternalized externalities.51
Furthermore, without government involvement there must be
a reliable system of private sector independent audits and
verification procedures in place.52
In a report by the National Academies of Science entitled,
The Drama of the Commons, Professor Elinor Ostrom
recommends several factors by which to assess the effectiveness
of such a system.53 Ostrom suggests analyzing the feasibility
of implementing the system, evaluating the environmental
effects on the resource as well as other affected resources, and
considering the economic effects on the regulated industry and
those who use the resource.54
B.

Implementation Feasibility

No matter how lofty the goals of a trading program
may be, it will not accomplish anything if it is not feasible to
implement. To determine implementation feasibility, one must
first analyze the method by which the resource is allocated
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among the users. For instance, some systems use a “first come,
first served” approach, while some allocate permits randomly
like a lottery.55 The most common method of allocating access
rights is a method known as “grandfathering.” Grandfathering
bases the initial allocation on historic emissions so that existing
sources only have to purchase any additional credits they may
need over and above the initial allocation.56 Because the costs
of implementing a tradable permits system are typically large,
the grandfathering approach has commonly been a necessary
ingredient in building the political support necessary to
implement the system.57 Accordingly, the CCX system allocates
an emissions amount equal to 4% below historic emissions
levels to participating companies. If they do not meet that 4%
goal, they will have to purchase credits that will bring their
emissions levels down to the 4% allocation.
The second factor in analyzing implementation
feasibility is whether a system has sufficient monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms. Insufficient monitoring and
enforcement can lead to increased emissions because the
aggregate limit could be breached, either on accident or
purposely.58 In order to increase compliance, many members
of the academic community feel it is important that the regulated
community have a substantial role in the “co-management” of
environmental resources.59 Some argue this is because the
government is not efficient at verifying and monitoring such
systems and should, therefore, let the private sector implement
the system once the government has set the rules.60 Despite
their arguments, the most common form of governance in
the U.S. today is a system of top-down management where
the regulated community plays a small role.61 CCX, on the
other hand, has no government input whatsoever and is run
solely by “the regulated community.” Although CCX has an
advisory board of non-industry representatives, it has no
decision-making power. This raises obvious concerns over
the credibility of the monitoring and enforcement of the CCX.
It is unclear what incentives the designers of CCX have to
ensure that the system is properly monitored and enforced
and is otherwise free from fraudulent activities. The most likely
incentive is that, if the CCX program is sufficiently credible,
participants will be able to trade their credits on exchanges in
foreign jurisdictions, or they can receive credit for them if the
U.S. ever adopts mandatory GHG reductions.
Assuming CCX designers wanted to ensure sufficient
monitoring and enforcement, they would first need to ensure
there was a proper monitoring system in place. Every successful
monitoring system must be able to identify the data needed to
monitor the trading and operations of the program, but also
gather, interpret and act on this information.62 The monitoring
system for CCX was designed partly by experienced staff at
the NASD, and was based in part on the widely-accepted GHG
Protocol. It will also utilize the NASD’s state-of-the-art market
surveillance technologies. Assuming that the final CCX
emissions submission protocol does not differ too much from
the GHG Protocol, it seems that CCX has an adequate system
in place to properly monitor the program. However, another
important component in a sufficient monitoring system is to
have an integrated computer system where all users can access
the trading system on a real-time basis.63 The CCX will operate
on a web-based system which will make monitoring easier.
However, the system will only be open to registered members
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of the exchange. The only information that will be publicly
available on the website will be the price of the credits and
other “nonproprietary” information.64 This creates a weakness
in the monitoring system as the companies are not under any
public pressure to report accurate information. Public scrutiny
is especially crucial in this case because it seems that both CCX
and the NASD have placed a lot of trust in the honesty of
these companies to report accurately. This seems unreasonable
after such recent scandals as Enron and WorldCom.
The most problematic element of the CCX program
is its enforcement mechanism. Even if the monitoring system
was fail-proof and caught every mistake and deception, it is
still unclear how the rules will be enforced. Member companies
must sign a contract promising to abide by the rules, and may
face sanctions if they violate the contract. It is unclear if these
sanctions will ever be imposed. Even if the NASD finds that
a company has purposely submitted false data, the final arbiter
is the CCX itself. It is unclear how lenient the CCX will be on
defaulting members.
C.

Environmental Effects

In order to be effective, a tradable permit system must
start by defining a sustainable target.65 This target might not
necessarily be efficient for many of the effected pollution
sources. In many cases, it provides the only opportunity to
achieve an environmentally beneficial outcome. The CCX
members agreed to reduce their GHG emissions to 4% below
the average of their 1998-2001 emissions. This is a modest
goal considering that the framers of the Kyoto Protocol agreed
that the world’s emission sources would need to reduce their
GHG emissions by at least 7% below 1990 levels if there was
any hope of curbing global warming.66 The few members of
the CCX, with their modest 4% goal, are not likely to reduce
the world’s GHG emissions to a “sustainable” level. If run
properly, the program can still produce positive environmental
results.
Carbon dioxide and other GHGs are arguably the
best pollutants for a credit trading program such as CCX.67
Carbon dioxide is not toxic so it does not endanger the health
of local communities if an emission source chooses to buy
credits to emit more CO2 at a specific plant. Furthermore,
reductions made at local sources can make a difference
worldwide. Even though the CCX is currently localized to a
few companies, mostly in the U.S., any reductions that result
from the exchange will have a positive effect on reducing global
warming.
Trading programs such as CCX also give flexibility to
companies on how they propose to meet their reduction goals.
This flexibility makes it more likely that participants will actually
meet their goal.68 However, there is always the danger of
uninternalized externalities, like protecting one resource at the
expense of another. 69 For example, CCX would not be
environmentally beneficial if the companies chose to reduce
their GHG emissions by installing technologies that caused them
to increase their nitrogen oxide emissions. However, this is
unlikely in such a program because climate change programs
tend to result in reductions of other pollutants as a side effect.70
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D.

Economic Effects

In evaluating the effectiveness of a pollution prevention
program, one must also evaluate the economic effects of the
program. For the regulated industry (or in this case, the
participating companies), there is a risk that the program will
involve high transaction costs, making voluntary participation
unlikely. Tradable permit programs, if adequately enforced,
tend to “increase the value of the commons to which the
permits apply.”71 Thus air pollution programs such as the CCX
will probably make it cheaper to meet the pollution control
targets.72
There is also the possibility that such a program can
become too economically beneficial for some sources, creating
market power in a few companies.73 The fact that the credits
are transferable allows the opportunity for some groups to
accumulate permits and to use them to gain economic power
in other markets. Typically, other programs have protections
against such activities and may put a limit on the amount of
credits one source can accumulate.74 Such programs are also
typically reviewed by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to
check for possible antitrust violations.75 The CCX does not
have any such limit on credit accumulation, nor has it ever been
reviewed by the DOJ. This may cause problems once the
trading actually begins.
Conclusion
In theory, the CCX is an admirable concept. It can help
reduce GHG emissions from the U.S. immediately, even if the
federal government does not adopt any GHG reduction
measures. However, the CCX has some significant weaknesses
that would need to be resolved in order for the program to be
effective. The monitoring system appears adequate, but it is
unclear how strictly violations will be enforced. Furthermore,
although any reductions in GHG emissions would be beneficial,
the program would need to significantly increase the 4% goal
in order to reach a sustainable level of GHG emissions. Finally,
the internal operations of the CCX seem to be hidden from
the public view. The CCX will have to open its doors to public
scrutiny if it hopes to receive respect from environmentalists
and other critics. Despite a few necessary improvements, the
CCX is an excellent learning tool. Overall, the CCX is more
useful as a learning tool to help pave the way for a more
comprehensive, mandatory emissions trading program.
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